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  This paper examines changes in the organization structure and profitability of a group of six 
large Italian banks over an eleven-year period, during which control was transferred from the State 
to private investors. In this paper, privatization is defined by the transfer of more than 50% of 
shares to private ownership. It occurred between 1993 and 1998 for these banks, which have about 
30% of all Italian banking assets. After privatization, there was an immediate high rate of turnover 
of top executives and membership of each bank￿s board of directors. A high rate of branch 
expansion that occurred before privatization essentially stopped with privatization. Relative to other 
Italian banks, the number of employees fell sharply and a variety of measures of profitability rose 
rapidly after privatization; in some cases, the realization of losses from bad loans made a large 
contribution to subsequent profitability. Results from simple regression models applied to a panel of 
five of these banks over eleven years, showed that there was a significant effect of privatization on 
staff costs and profits and, moreover, on trends in costs and profits. Further, privatization coincided 
with more securitization and with a higher rate of growth of fee income. Thus, while the time span 
of the post-privatization era is short, the early indications are that privatization is leading to an 
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THE PERFORMANCE OF SOME RECENTLY PRIVATIZED ITALIAN BANKS  






Economists often argue that private ownership yields large benefits. The economic gains from 
private ownership, relative to public ownership, result from increased competition in markets that 
induces firms to produce more efficiently and to reward factor inputs according to their marginal 
productivities. When state enterprises are privatized, they often are sold to the public, which allows 
for a reduction in public sector debt. In addition, there are ￿political￿ gains from private ownership 
that result from a reduced presence of the public sector (and thus political power) in the economy 
and the satisfactions and incentives that are provided to individuals by opportunities to create and to 
participate in the administration of firms
 2.  
In contrast with the idea that ￿Supporters of privatization claim that the private sector can do a 
better job than the public sector￿ (Gormley, 1991, p. 6), some observers have pointed out some 
weaknesses in the case for private ownership. First, ￿there is not comparative evidence to prove 
that, within the capitalist world, countries with relatively higher public spending or relatively larger 
public enterprise sectors have slower rates of economic growth￿ (Starr, 1991, p. 30). Second, 
because of the public relevance of some services (both from externalities and from their underlying 
essentiality), widespread private ownership could require the strengthening of public supervision 
and regulation in order to protect consumers (Masera, 1994). Finally, privatization is not the only 
remedy for weak performances by state-owned enterprises. If public firms fail, ￿. . . public 
bureaucracies can be improved through institutional redesign￿ (Gormley, 1991, p. 6). 
During the 1990s the Italian Government carried out a large number of privatizations; a wide 
variety of economic activities were involved in this new policy. The Italian banking system was one 
of the first sectors to be privatized. It is likely that the robust regulatory framework of the Italian 
banking market played a crucial role in this choice. The Italian State sold shares of large banks to 
private investors; in some cases the control of a bank was transferred to a few large companies and 
in others a bank became a public company with a large number of shareholders.  
                                                            
1 Respectively, Banca d￿Italia, Research Department and Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
A large part of the paper was drafted while Farabullini was a visitor at the University of Wisconsin￿Madison. The 
views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Bank of Italy.    
2 Among others, see Butler (1991) and Preda et al. (1993).   2 
The largest part of banking privatization occurred between 1992 and 1998. During this period, 
the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI - a government holding organization) sold the three 
Banche d￿Interesse Nazionale (banks of national interest) in its portfolio; four out of six public-law 
banks, Banche di Diritto Pubblico, became private through a public offer; and control of one of the 
largest savings banks in the world, Cariplo, several smaller saving banks (Casse di Risparmio), and 
special credit institutions were transferred to private owners.  
To appreciate the magnitude of this process, in 1993 the seven public sector commercial 
banks had about 35 percent of total Italian banking system assets. A large part of another 48 percent 
of Italian banking￿ assets shifted from foundations and from national and local governments to the 
private sector between 1992 and 1998 (see Fazio, 1999) through privatizations. According to Paul 
Betts (The Financial Times, 2000): ￿The initial catalyst of change [in the banking system] was 
privatization￿.  
The economics of privatization is a very large topic. At the outset, it is necessary to limit the 
scope of the investigation. This paper does not consider the techniques of privatization (asset sales, 
contracting out, vouchers, etc.)
3, public and ￿political￿ reasons behind banking privatization
4, or the 
implications for the entire Italian banking system - i.e., strengthening of competition or differences 
in the goals of public and private managers
5. Instead, the main goal of this paper is to analyze 
performances of large privatized banks in order to examine whether there are improvements in 
terms of competitiveness and efficiency and, thus, if one of the benefits of privatization predicted 
by economic theory is being achieved. The approach is to view privatized banks as ￿new￿ banks 
and to compare them with their pre-privatized state and with other groups of banks.  
We believe that conclusions from this analysis will be useful for interpreting changes in other 
banks in Italy and, perhaps, especially those banks where the influence of foundations has been 
pronounced. The enforcement of a new law (the ￿Ciampi law￿
6) about the presence of foundations 
will greatly reduce the importance of a foundation￿s ownership of a bank￿s equity; banks previously 
controlled by foundations are increasingly likely to resemble recently privatized banks.  
After this introduction, the second section describes some preliminary issues about data and 
the sample of banks. The third section examines the impact of banking privatization from an 
organizational point of view. The fourth section compares, on an aggregated basis, privatized banks 
and other Italian banks in terms of profitability and efficiency. The fifth section presents results of 
                                                            
3 See Butler (1991). 
4 See Anderloni (1999). 
5 See Sapienza (1999). 
6 L. n. 461/98 and D.Lgs. n. 153/99.   3 
econometric tests of the impact of privatization on individual banks. The sixth section summarizes 
the findings.  
 
2. THE SAMPLE AND DATA 
In order to construct a sample of privatized banks, it is necessary to propose criteria for 
deciding when a bank has been privatized. Some observers (for example, see de Cecco, 2000) point 
out that Italian public bodies (including foundations) keep a significant presence in some banks. 
Such a presence could permit the State to maintain control over the banks and, thus, they should not 
be considered private. In other words, even after a public offering the State is still able to decide the 
governance structure of a credit institution, to appoint the board of directors, to choose goals and 
strategies, etc. There is a large literature on the relation between ownership and control of firms (see 
Cubbin and Leech, 1983 for references and Messori, 1998 for the Italian public banks).  
A formal determination of whether a bank is publicly or privately controlled is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Instead we propose simple empirical criteria. We include in the sample of 
banks, and thus we consider privatized, banks that have the following features
7: 
1.  Government disposal of a majority or all of its shares through public offer and 
2.  A majority of shares owned by the private sector. 
These points denote a willingness of public bodies to cede control of banks. 
The paper ￿Le privatizzazioni in Italia dal 1992￿ (R&S, 2000)
8 identifies six large credit 
institutions that had recently been privatized. They are the focus of the present analysis. The six 
banks play a primary role in the Italian credit market and hold about thirty percent of total Italian 
banking system assets. Three banks, Banca Commerciale Italiana (Comit), Banca di Roma, and 
Credito Italiano, were banks of national interest that were controlled by IRI; the others belonged 
directly or indirectly to the Treasury. 
Table 1 reports when major stock offerings to the public occurred and when more than fifty 
percent of a bank￿s outstanding stock was first held by the private sector. In the cases of Banca di 
Roma and Istituto San Paolo di Torino (S. Paolo), the 1997 public offerings were, respectively, 37 
and 23 percent of shares, which was sufficient to transfer control to the private sector. At the end of 
1998, the public sector held 37 percent of Banca di Roma￿s equity and about 25 percent of the 
equity of S. Paolo
9. S. Paolo and Istituto Mobiliare Italiano (IMI) merged in 1998. However, the 
                                                            
7 In order to avoid discontinuities in aggregated time series, the sample does not include banks that were involved in 
large mergers and acquisitions. 
8 This paper was prepared in response to a request from the Italian Parliament, in order to assess the outcomes of Italian 
privatizations. It analyzes the most important operations from an economic point of view, but it does not deal with 
banking privatization. 
9 This information is drawn from web site of the Italian Companies and Stock Exchange Commission (www.consob.it).  4 
two banks are included because both institutions are in the sample and, thus, do not cause a 
discontinuity in aggregated time series. After 1997, data for S. Paolo reflect the effects of this 
merger. 
We recognize that the criteria adopted are arbitrary but are confident that these banks 
represent an informative sample for understanding the impact of bank privatization.  
There are other banks that have been privatized, so we are not considering all privatizations. 
Savings banks sold to private investors, banks acquired by privatized banks, and privatizations that 
occurred after 1998 - e.g., Mediocredito Centrale, - are not considered in this paper. These 
privatizations have not been carried out with a public offering of stock and thus do not satisfy the 
first criterion above. In particular, three important privatizations are not considered in this paper: 
Banco di Napoli, Banco di Sicilia, and Cariplo. The first two privatizations were a consequence of 
weak operating results and were essentially bailouts; these could be misleading given the goals of 
this paper. The post-privatization results for these two banks are difficult to assess, because 
profitability has been mainly reestablished with legislative and/or administrative interventions. We 
exclude also the Cariplo privatization because it was achieved through a merger with a private 
banking group, Intesa. 
Analysis of this sample is made possible because of the existence of data collected by the 
Bank of Italy. Information about three of the six banks in the sample includes data on special credit 
sections since 1990
10. Although some time series have small breaks because of the adoption of new 
bank accounting regulations in 1993 and the consolidation of special credit sections, we think such 
anomalies do not substantively distort the following analysis. 
 
3. ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS  
Organizational structure is what defines a firm. The economic theory of a firm derives from 
seminal contributions by Coase (1937), Simon (1979), and others. When privatization occurs, a new 
firm emerges (Cf. Giorgino and Tasca, 1999). A new group of top managers and a new 
organizational structure represent important changes that may guide a company toward a more 
efficient and profitable path
11. In this section we examine these two aspects. First, we examine the 
boards of directors of the six banks to see if privatizations led to a change in their composition and 
assignments, as the literature predicts. 
                                                            
10 Special credit sections were engaged in the medium and long-term credit market. From 1995, their accounts are 
consolidated with the accounts of a related commercial bank.  
11 Generale and Gobbi (1999, p. 51) find a ￿weak, though statistically significant, correlation between the bank￿s 
profitability and the probability of replacing top management￿.   5 
Second, we investigate if a new organizational decision-making structure appears after 
privatization. Ideally, information about the internal structure (number and functions of 
departments, job procedures, etc.) should be studied. Because such internal data are not available, 
we perform this analysis using information about the number and composition of staff (percentage 
of managers, officers, and other employees) and the number and importance of domestic branches. 
This information is likely to signal the presence of organizational change, if it is occurring. 
Tables 2 and 3 respectively report information about turnover of top managers and 
membership of boards of directors for the six banks in the sample. Table 2 shows that the chairman 
of the board changes in the year of privatization in two cases and during the year after privatization 
in two other cases. Two changes in managing director (or general manager) occur in the year of 
privatization and one in the next year. Thus, while there is a high rate of turnover of top officers 
when Italian banks are privatized, only about fifty percent are replaced. An interpretation is that 
new owners often sought to retain the skills and experience of these top officers for an 
undetermined period.  
Table 3 shows that in the year after privatization about ninety percent of the members of the 
boards of directors are new. The change of membership occurs in both the year of privatization and 
in the following year, but seems to be larger in the latter. Because members of the board represent 
the interests of owners, it is not surprising that there is a high rate of turnover when a bank is 
privatized. 
Table 4 reports information about the number and composition of personnel in the privatized 
banks
12 and in other Italian banks. During the decade, the privatized banks have experienced a large 
restructuring of staff. The decrease in number of employees began in 1992, before that of other 
Italian banks, and continues with a sharp acceleration in the most recent years when all 
privatizations were completed. At the end of the period, the cumulative reduction in number of 
employees was about twenty percent. In part this reflects the ￿encouraged resignations plans￿ 
undertaken by privatized banks (for example, see Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, 1999). 
Table 4 also shows an increase in the fraction of personnel who are managers and officers. 
One plausible explanation for the growing share of managerial personnel is the rapid expansion in 
number of branches. Many of the new branches are streamlined offices with a small number of 
employees, relative to traditional branches. Usually an officer is in charge of each branch and the 
large increase in the number of branches has required an increase in the number of officers. Further, 
an increasing share of a bank￿s employees was deployed in branches, rather than at a bank￿s head 
                                                            
12 IMI is not included in this analysis because data are only available after 1994 and because, before the merger with S. 
Paolo, IMI did not have branches; all activities occurred at its headquarters in Rome.  6 
office. In many cases, it appears that employees at new branches came from other offices of a bank. 
The geographic distribution of employees was becoming less concentrated at the same time that the 
number of bank employees was falling. It is difficult to identify and measure these different changes 
with available data, but it is easy to conclude that the distribution of staff of privatized banks has 
changed in order to develop new business (see section four), and to move decision-making in an 
organization closer to the market. 
An interpretation of these trends is that the decrease in personnel is concentrated among older 
employees, who tend to have the highest salaries. The new managers and officers tend to be young 
and, therefore, have accumulated fewer seniority-based salary increases. The privatized banks can 
be understood to be pursuing the dual goals of reducing staff costs and of motivating personnel to 
increase productivity with promises of possible future merit increases. Data in Table 10 below seem 
to confirm this interpretation; in the last years of the 1990s, cost per worker in real terms
13 was 
decreasing and assets per worker were increasing. 
The growth in number of branches and the consequent increase in competition in credit 
markets is an important dimension of organizational restructuring (see Giorgino and Tasca, 1999). 
Several recent papers have analyzed the large expansion of branches in Italy in the last decade. (See 
Calcagnini et al., 1999, for references). This expansion occurred throughout the Italian banking 
industry and was not simply a consequence of privatization. However, it is interesting to compare 
branch expansion of the six privatized banks with that at other Italian banks.  
Table 5 shows a strong increase in the number of branches of privatized banks until 1996, 
after which the privatized banks seemed to be rationalizing rather than expanding their branch 
systems. The growth rate of branches in the years 1997-9 was the lowest in the past decade, which 
was followed by a slight acceleration in 2000. The number of towns where privatized banks 
collectively had a branch was essentially constant from 1996 until 2000, when there was a slight 
increase. The number of branches of the privatized banks had risen very rapidly until 1995. 
Branches of other banks rose less rapidly than those of privatized banks until 1996, after which the 
growth rate of their branches was higher than that of privatized banks in every year.  
An important point arises from Table 6. Privatized banks￿ share of small branches (branches 
with not more than 10 employees) rose rapidly between 1990 and 2000, from 37% to 66% of all 
branches. This tremendous change in organizational structure of privatized banks entailed even 
more dramatic changes in job assignments, internal controls of decision-making authority, and 
responsibilities for employees. In other words, privatized banks experienced a large organizational 
restructuring in order to improve efficiency, to provide new services for customers, and to adapt to 
                                                            
13 In the paper, ￿real￿ values are computed using the GDP deflator.  7 
rapid developments in the technology of financial markets. Other Italian banks have always had a 
large share of small branches; between 1990 and 2000 this share rose from 65% to 81%. Other 
banks￿ share was larger because they were smaller banks with branches more concentrated in small 
towns than the recently privatized banks. In part, the increased privatized banks￿ share of small 
branches reflects their rapid expansion between 1990 and 1997, evident in Table 5, into small towns 
where the mixture of services offered at a branch is less rich. However, it also reflects private 
banks￿ enhanced ability to deliver complex services with a smaller employee complement.  
 
4. PROFITABILITY AND OTHER INDICATORS 
In this section we attempt to examine whether the ￿new￿ Italian privatized banks are more 
profitable and efficient than the ￿old￿ public banks. There is a large literature about the 
determinants of bank profitability and efficiency. For Italian banks, see, for example Resti (1996) 
and Calcagnini and Hester (1997). However, there is little theoretical guidance about how to 
measure gains in efficiency and profitability in the short run, when a small number of banks are 
transitioning from public to private ownership.     
Because the six privatizations occurred between 1993 and the beginning of 1998, we propose 
to compare selected measures of bank income and expense in the early 1990s (before privatization) 
and at the end of the decade (when privatization was completed). Table 7 reports some measures of 
bank profitability for the aggregate of the six banks in the sample
14. Ratios of profits to total assets 
and the rate of return on equity, both before and after taxes, were high in 1990 and 1991 and again 
from 1998 to 2000. Profit rates of all banks were much lower in the intervening years. 
The table also shows that net interest income, expressed as a percentage of total assets, 
decreased with falling market interest rates. Farabullini and Gobbi (1996) have attributed a positive 
correlation between net interest income and market interest rates to the rigidity of interest rates on 
bank deposits. Because of the presence of close substitutes, such as government bonds, interest rates 
on deposits are less flexible than interest rates on loans. Consequently, when interest rates fall net 
interest income falls. Despite falling interest rates in the last years of the decade, privatized banks 
were able to offset this adverse effect on profitability through innovative management. First, as 
shown in Table 8, privatized banks creatively adjusted their portfolios by acquiring more high 
yielding loans, repurchase agreements, and shares and participations and by collecting more funds 
                                                            
14 The ratios are calculated by using sums of individual bank information for the six banks. Total assets in all tables are 
a weighted average of total assets. The weights are .125, .25, .25, .25, and .125 and were applied, respectively, to total 
assets at the end of preceding year and at the end of each quarter of a year.  8 
through low-cost sight deposits, bonds
15, external deposits, and equity. They sharply reduced high-
cost certificates of deposit and miscellaneous other assets
16.   
Second, as shown in Table 9, fee income from services rose considerably at privatized banks. 
These fees include commissions from selling new financial products to small investors, who were 
seeking higher yields as interest rates fell. Low interest rates on government bonds have induced 
investors to shift funds toward the stock market and portfolio management services - e.g., mutual 
funds (see Banca d￿Italia, 2000).  
The low return on assets in 1997 was due to very large write-offs of loans at some of the 
banks in our sample. Table 9 reports the values of adjustments on loans for the sum of the six 
banks. It should be recognized that disclosing these losses is a necessary and constructive part of the 
process of privatization, because it improves the credibility of a bank￿s accounts. In order to sell 
shares to sophisticated private investors, a bank￿s books must be actuarially sound. Privatization of 
a bank with an undisclosed large amount of non-performing loans could result in failure. Investors 
would not buy shares or would submit a very low bid for shares, if they believed a bank￿s value was 
overstated. In other words, for a privatization to be successful, investors must be persuaded that a 
resulting new bank can earn a risk-adjusted market rate of return on the funds that they subscribe.  
This requirement applies to all privatizations, but seems especially important for bank 
privatizations where information asymmetries are pervasive. Traditional banking activity is also 
based on the trust of customers; if institutional and small investors are not in favor of privatization 
because a bank seems unsound, its customers might shift their accounts to other banks. Bank 
privatization provides an incentive to reorganize a credit institution and rationalize its financial 
accounts. 
Additional information about restructuring in Italian banks is provided in Table 10 where 
ratios of assets and costs to the number of bank employees are reported for privatized and ￿all 
other￿
17 Italian banks. In both groups of banks there has been a large increase in assets per 
employee over the past decade ￿ slightly larger at the privatized banks. The increase in assets per 
employee at privatized banks may be effectively understated, because privatized banks have been 
more active in the securitization of assets, which removes assets from a bank￿s balance sheet. 
Securitization is a recent innovation in Italy and it is important to record that recently privatized 
banks were quick to employ this technique: table 11 shows that the privatized banks have issued 37 
                                                            
15 Because of a change in tax laws in 1997, it became less costly to raise funds through the issuance of bonds than 
through CDs.  
16 Other assets include fiscal items, suspense and transit items, accrued interest receivable, and on-balance-sheet 
derivatives.      9 
percent of all securitized assets of Italian banks during the years 1997-2000, and 60 percent in the 
first year. Three of the privatized banks are active in securitization. 
At the end of the decade, the average cost of an employee at a privatized bank in real terms 
was very similar to the cost in the initial years, which suggests that costs were being effectively 
controlled. It was much higher during the years in which privatization was occurring. The average 
cost of an employee at privatized and other banks was quite similar over the decade, which may 
reflect nationwide collective bargaining. At privatized banks, as shown in Table 9, the ratio of staff 
costs to total assets decreased over time and reached its lowest value at the end of the decade. The 
lower average cost of an employee in the most recent years has contributed importantly to the 
improved profitability of all Italian banks. 
Are the profitability and productivity gains of the six privatized banks due to the new 
shareholders and changed corporate structure? Or, are they attributable to other external factors, 
such as a general improvement in the Italian banking system? In order to answer this question, we 
present a comparison between privatized banks and other Italian banks, which on average are much 
smaller than the six privatized banks. According to several papers (see Landi, 1990), small credit 
institutions tend to have higher ratios of net income to total assets than large banks. A better 
knowledge of local markets is believed to allow small banks to better contain losses on loans. In 
addition, small banks may have a highly specialized management that is responsive to local 
conditions and allows lower operating costs
18. On the other hand Calcagnini and Hester (1997), 
using a statistical cost accounting model that controlled for inter-bank variations in portfolio 
composition, report evidence of relatively greater profitability at large banks. They attributed higher 
profitability to the presence of economies of scale, although they also reported finding evidence of 
competitive imperfections in loan markets, which might favor some small banks.  
Our analysis focuses on a comparison of trends in the ratios of summed measures of income 
and profits to summed total assets at privatized banks with their counterparts at other banks in Italy. 
Figure 1 shows that the ratio of net interest income fell at both groups of banks, but the difference 
between them narrowed over time. Privatized banks always had a lower ratio. Figure 2 indicates 
that the ratio of gross income (net interest income plus all other income) to assets also fell at both 
groups of banks, but fell less at the privatized banks. In Figures 3 and 4 it can be seen that net 
current operating income and profits before taxes, respectively, rose at privatized banks relative to 
other banks. Initially other banks were more profitable than the privatized banks, but not in later 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
17 ￿Other Italian banks￿ include the credit institutions in the monthly sample used in the publications of the Banca 
d￿Italia until 2000, excluding the six privatized banks. Ratios are again calculated by using sums of individual bank 
data.  10
years. The very large realizations of losses at privatized banks in 1997, which are conspicuous in 
Figure 4, may have been a contributing factor to this improvement, because non-earning loans were 
removed from balance sheets. 
Figure 5 suggests that rising fees on services were an important component of the increase in 
gross income in the last years of the decade, and that privatized banks have been more aggressive in 
developing these new financial products than other banks. This can be interpreted as evidence of 
greater entrepreneurship by ￿new private￿ banks and more rapid assimilation of financial market 
innovations. It should be acknowledged, however, that these banks might have had an advantage 
relative to other banks when marketing new products because they are large and well known. We 
cannot distinguish between gains from privatizations and those from size and having a good 
reputation, when new innovations occur. 
  Figure 6 shows that the rate of return on equity of the aggregate of the six privatized banks 
rose sharply after 1997. In part the rise was a consequence of writing off bad loans, but mostly it 
reflects improved net operating results. Evidence supporting this interpretation appears in the 
following section. 
We have also examined but do not report
19 the ratios shown in figures 1 - 5 for other Italian 
banks, excluding Banco di Napoli and Banco di Sicilia, which had reestablished profitability largely 
through legislative and/or administrative interventions; the comparison between this new group and 
the six banks substantially confirms the foregoing conclusions.  
Summarizing, the ratios of profits to average total assets at privatized banks seem to be rising 
relatively to other Italian banks, especially in the most recent years. Some efficiency measures, such 
as assets and cost per employee, are difficult to interpret. Privatized banks seem more aggressive 
and seem to pay more attention to new opportunities available in financial markets.   
 
5. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
In the preceding sections we examined privatizations using tables constructed from aggregate 
data for two populations of banks. In this section we analyze a panel of data for five Italian banks 
that were privatized using simple econometric tools, in order to test whether privatization was 
related to changes in bank variables. There is no formal econometric model underlying this analysis. 
Rather, we employ simple linear models to test whether observed variables are different before and 
after privatization. There are 55 observations - five banks over the eleven years, 1990 - 2000. We 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
18 For example, Marullo and Passacantando (1986) show that savings and cooperative banks (these categories are 
mainly made up of medium and small banks) have lower operating costs.  
19 These new ratios cannot be reported in order to safeguard the confidentiality of individual bank data.  11
have arbitrarily suppressed information about IMI before its merger with S. Paolo, because of its 
uniqueness ￿ e.g., having no branches, etc
20.  
The analysis is performed using ordinary least squares estimation. The dependent variables 
are drawn from income statements and balance sheets of the privatized banks; many of the variables 
have been discussed above. We consider two specifications. In the first we regress each of 21 
variables on a binary (dummy) variable that takes on a value of 1 for each observation in years after 
privatization, and 0 otherwise. The second specification includes this variable and a second variable 
that is a post-privatization trend, which takes on a value of 1 in the first year after privatization, a 
value of 2 in the second year, etc., and is otherwise zero. A linear trend is not likely to be an 
appropriate specification for ratio variables over long time spans, but it is a useful descriptive 
device for the few available years of observations that we have after privatization. 
Tables 12 and 13 report results for the two specifications. The first nine rows in each table are 
ratios of income or expense to average total assets in a year. In Table 12 six of the nine coefficients 
on the binary privatization variable have ￿t￿ ratios that are significantly different from zero at the 
one-percent level in a two-tailed test. In particular, after privatization the banks had higher fee 
income, lower staff costs, higher net operating income, and higher profits before and after income 
taxes. Binary variable coefficients are also significantly positive for rates of return on equity, before 
and after income taxes. These results conform to our expectation of how privatization should affect 
these variables and to admittedly loose theoretical predictions about the effects of privatization. The 
ratio of net interest income to total assets fell with privatization, but this is best interpreted as a 
consequence of steadily falling nominal interest rates in Italy during the 1990s.  
Table 13 provides further insight into the effects of privatization on bank income and 
expenses, because it differentiates between a static ￿shift￿ effect that is captured by the binary 
variable considered in the preceding paragraph and a dynamic ￿trend￿ effect. The trend captures the 
idea that privatization should result in a continued strengthening improvement in performance. By 
allowing both variables to appear in each equation, we can distinguish between them because the 
coefficients measure the marginal effect of adding a variable when the other is present. In Table 13 
the significance of coefficients of the binary variable in the first nine rows effectively vanishes; 
only the coefficient on the fee income variable is significant at the five-percent level. For the same 
nine rows, coefficients on the trend variable are significantly different from zero at the one-percent 
level in two cases and at the five-percent level in three other cases. Staff costs as a fraction of 
average total assets fall increasingly in the years after privatization. Fee income, net current 
                                                            
20 The equations described in this section were also estimated using 52 observations, which excluded S. Paolo 
observations after the S. Paolo-IMI merger. The results were essentially the same for the two samples.  12
operating income, and profits before tax variables progressively rise in the years after privatization, 
as do the rates of return on equity before and after taxes. These trends suggest that Table 12 and the 
earlier tables that report aggregate privatized bank data may understate the gains from privatization 
because they ignore intensifying improvements in performance. The negative trend coefficient on 
the net interest expense variable strongly supports the interpretation at the end of the preceding 
paragraph; it reflects steadily falling nominal interest rates. 
Rows 12 through 15 in each table concern selected portfolio ratios. The first variable is the 
ratio of a bank￿s average loans to its average total assets. In Table 12 the coefficient on the binary 
variable unexpectedly implies that banks have a lower ratio after privatization; apart from 
securitization, we have no good story for why this should be observed. In Table 13 the coefficients 
on both the shift and trend variables are not significantly different from zero. The second variable is 
the ratio of a bank￿s nonperforming loans (sofferenze) to total assets. The coefficient on the binary 
variable is insignificant in Table 12, but positive in Table 13; the coefficient on the trend is 
significantly negative in that equation. Superficially, it seems that at the time of privatization these 
banks had more nonperforming loans than earlier in the decade, but they were increasingly ridding 
themselves of them after that date. Somewhat surprisingly, there is no statistical evidence of a 
relation between the ratio of checking (sight) deposits to total assets and the shift and trend 
variables. The ratio of certificates of deposit to total assets was negatively related to the binary 
variable in Table 12 and to the trend variable in Table 13. Because of the aforementioned tax law 
changes, it is unclear whether this result reflects enlightened behavior by privatized banks or a 
regime change in the tax code. 
The final six rows in the two tables concern various operating characteristics and ratios. In 
Table 12 three variables involving the total number of a bank￿s employees have coefficients on the 
binary variable that differ significantly from zero at the one percent level. As in the earlier tables of 
aggregates, they imply that after privatization banks had fewer employees (the logarithm of a 
bank￿s employees was smaller), more real assets per employee, and a smaller number of employees 
per branch. In Table 13 the coefficients on the binary variable for these variables are not significant, 
but the coefficients on the trend variable are significantly negative for number of employees and 
positive for assets per employee. An interpretation is that privatization accelerated changes in these 
two variables. There is no evident effect of privatization on the ratio of managers to total 
employees, the percentage of employees deployed in branches, or in assets per branch in either 
Table 12 or Table 13. An interpretation is that changes in these variables noted in earlier tables of 
aggregate data reflect an ongoing restructuring of Italian banks, but there is too much variation 
across the five privatized banks to associate them with the privatization process.  13
 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we study the outcomes of privatizations of six large Italian banks, carried out 
between 1993 and the beginning of 1998. Our choice of banks was guided by a report for the Italian 
Parliament and banks were defined to be privatized when sufficient shares were distributed through 
a public offer so that the residual share ownership by public bodies was below fifty percent of 
outstanding shares. The six privatized banks in our sample hold about one-third of total Italian 
banking system assets.  
We study privatizations looking at organization and profitability. We employ a very simple 
set of statistical models to test the validity of our conclusions using a panel of the five privatized 
banks that had branches. 
From an organizational point of view, we first examined whether privatizations resulted in 
changes in a bank￿s top managers and in the composition of its board of directors. The top officers 
(chairman and the managing director or general manager) of the six banks had a high turnover rate. 
About fifty percent were replaced during the year of privatization or the following year. However, 
almost all members of boards of directors changed during the year of privatization or the following 
year. This suggests that new owners replaced a large part of the board in order to insure that their 
interests were being respected. However, new shareholders often chose to keep top executives 
because, among other reasons, of their skills and expertise. Changing the membership of the board 
is a first step in the transition toward a new bank, but maintaining some continuity in management 
is probably essential for a smooth transition. 
Second, we examined whether privatization results in a redeployment of lower echelon 
personnel. Between 1990 and 2000, the aggregate number of employees at the six privatized banks 
decreased about twenty percent. In the preceding section, an analysis of the panel of five privatized 
banks suggested that privatization resulted in an acceleration of the reduction of employees, 
possibly through ￿encouraged resignations plans,￿ which some privatized banks adopted. The 
aggregate data also suggested that the percentage of employees who were officers was also rising, 
which may be associated with rapid growth of branches. However, no evidence of a stable relation 
between privatization and the share of employees who were officers was found in the statistical 
analysis reported in the preceding section. Evidently other variables and a more sophisticated model 
are needed to predict the percentage of employees who are officers. 
Branch expansion also plays a role in the reorganization of privatized banks. Before 1996 the 
banks that were to be privatized greatly increased the number of their branches, but after that year 
branches of privatized banks rose quite slowly. They seemed to be attempting to rationalize their  14
branch network and were not interested in more branches. Other Italian banks, by way of contrast, 
maintained a fairly high rate of branch expansion throughout the 1990s. Shunning branch expansion 
may prove to be an enlightened policy by the privatized banks in a period of rapid technical 
progress. Another distinctive policy of privatized banks seemed to be reducing the number of 
employees at a branch. In aggregate data for privatized banks, the fraction of branches with ten or 
fewer employees rose sharply and was approaching that of other Italian banks. In the preceding 
section evidence was provided that the number of employees at a branch was significantly lower 
after privatization, but we did not focus on the number of branches with ten or fewer employees in 
that work. The fraction of branches with ten or fewer employees fell most rapidly in the years 
before privatization when the rate of branch expansion was high.  
After privatization, profitability rose. Aggregate ratios of profits to total assets and the rate of 
return on equity increased; the increase in profitability of the six privatized banks was larger than 
that at other Italian banks. In the preceding section￿s econometric results, net operating income and 
profits before and after taxes, expressed as a fraction of average total assets, were higher after 
privatization and were usually rising more rapidly after privatization. The same was true for return 
on equity. The improvement in profitability of privatized banks can be attributed largely to rapidly 
increasing fee income from providing services and falling staff costs, which are evident both in the 
aggregate data for privatized banks and in the econometric results. The strong profits results seem to 
signal impressive gains from privatization and associated restructuring.  
In the latter years of the 1990s, privatized banks have greatly increased fee income. In part 
this reflects a new situation in Italian financial markets, where Treasury bonds are less attractive 
and professional management of saving is a growing business. Privatized banks seem to have had a 
more aggressive strategy; organizational redesign may have been important in order to market new, 
successful financial products. 
During the 1990s the ratio of staff costs to total assets at the six privatized banks steadily 
decreased; the real cost of an employee grew in the early years of the decade, but fell in the second 
half to about the level of 1990. The number of employees fell steadily. Together these patterns 
suggest that privatized banks have controlled staff costs and managed to achieve an increase in 
efficiency, which importantly contributed to improved profitability.  
Profits of the six privatized banks, as a percentage of average assets, and return on equity are 
rising relative to other Italian banks. Cost per employee is strictly controlled at privatized banks, but 
it is still slightly higher than at other banks. Total assets per employee are similar at both groups of 
banks. It remains to be seen whether privatized banks￿ earnings can continue to rise relative to other 
Italian banks.  15
In 1997, immediately before privatization, some banks in our sample made large write-offs of 
bad loans, resulting in large negative profits. This suggests that the public owners had carried out a 
￿cleaning￿ of bank balance sheets, in order to place sound banks on the market. This is very 
important for successful privatizations, but especially so in the case of banking because information 
asymmetries are pervasive. Further, a bank￿s customers need to be reassured by having a sound 
balance sheet, because a bank may no longer have recourse to the State in the event of a failure. 
Without a sound balance sheet, customers might be tempted to move their accounts to other banks. 
Summing up, privatizations resulted in changes in managers and organizational structure and 
in improved profitability and efficiency. The latter cannot entirely be disentangled from ongoing 
changes and improvements in the Italian banking industry. This paper represents a first step towards 
a complete analysis of the impact of privatization on banks. In the next years, it should be possible 
to increase the sample of privatized banks, which will permit a better understanding of the 
consequences of privatization. It may be fruitful in future work also to compare the results from 
studies of privatized banks with those of privatized nonfinancial enterprises.  
               
June 27, 2001 16
REFERENCES 
 
Anderloni, L. (1999), ￿Methods of Privatization: Optimisation of the Objectives of Sellers and 
Investors, and the Role of Financial Institutions￿, in ￿Banking Privatisation in Europe￿, ed. Ruozi, 
R. and L. Anderloni, Springer, pp. 45-92. 
 
Banca d￿Italia (2000), Relazione Annuale sul 1999, Roma. 
  
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (1999), Bilancio Annuale 1998, Roma. 
  
Betts, P. (2000), ￿More mergers to come￿, in Financial Times, December 11. 
  
Butler, S. (1991), ￿Privatization for Public Purposes￿, in Privatization and Its Alternatives, ed. 
Gormley, W. T. Jr., Madison, Wisconsin:  University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 17-24. 
 
Calcagnini, G. and D. D. Hester (1997), ￿Cambiamento istituzionale e redditivit￿ delle banche in 
Italia￿, Rivista di Politica Economica, 87, 1, pp. 3-42. 
 
Calcagnini, G., R. De Bonis, and D. D. Hester (1999), ￿Determinants of Bank Branch Expansion in 
Italy￿, University of Wisconsin, SSRI Working Paper No. 9932. 
 
Coase, R.  (1937), ￿The Nature of the Firm￿, Economica, 4, pp. 386-405. 
 
Cubbin, J. and D. Leech (1983), ￿On the Size of a Controlling Shareholding￿, Economic Journal, 
93, June, pp. 351-69. 
 
De Cecco, M. (2000), ￿La politica italiana delle privatizzazioni￿, in Le privatizzazioni nell￿industria 
manifatturiera italiana, ed. Affinito M., M. de Cecco and A. Dringoli, Roma: Donzelli Editore, pp. 
15-37.  
 
Farabullini, F. and G. Gobbi (1996), ￿La redditivit￿ delle banche italiane negli ultimi venti anni￿, 
manuscript. 
 
Fazio, A. (1999), La ristrutturazione del sistema bancario italiano, Senato della Repubblica, Roma.  
 
Giorgino, M and R. Tasca (1999), ￿The Strategic and Organisational Effects of Bank Privatization￿, 
in Banking Privatisation in Europe, ed. Ruozi, R. and L. Anderloni, Springer, pp. 93-119. 
 
Generale, A. and G. Gobbi (1999), ￿Corporate governance and bank profitability: empirical 
evidence from the Italian experience￿, in Monetary and Regulatory implications of changes in the 
banking industry, BIS Conference papers, vol. 7, pp. 34-54. 
 
Gormley, W. T. Jr. (1991), ￿The Privatization Controversy￿, in Privatization and Its Alternatives, 
ed. Gormley, W. T. Jr., Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 3-16. 
 
Landi A., (1990), Dimensioni, costi e profitti delle banche italiane, Il Mulino. 
 
Marullo, P. and F. Passacantando (1986), ￿La redditivit￿ bancaria in Italia. Problemi metodologici e 
aspetti empirici￿, Banca d￿Italia, Temi di discussione no. 82. 
  17
Messori, M. (1998), ￿Banche, riassetti proprietari e privatizzazioni￿, Stato e mercato, 52, aprile, Il 
Mulino, pp. 93-126. 
 
Masera, R. (1994), ￿Le privatizzazioni in Italia￿, in Le Privatizzazioni: gli aspetti tecnici piø 
rilevanti, Senato della Repubblica, Roma, pp. 74-86. 
 
Preda S., R. Ruozi, F. Baronio, and M. Giorgino (1993), Le privatizzazioni in Italia. Aspetti 
strategici, economici e finanziari, Edibank, Milano. 
 
Resti, A. (1996), ￿La definizione del prodotto bancario e l￿esistenza di un indice univariato: alcune 
evidenze sulla separabilit￿ della funzione di costo in Italia￿, Il Risparmio, 4-5, luglio-ottobre , pp. 
1037-57. 
 
Ricerche & Studi, S.p.a. (2000), Le privatizzazioni in Italia dal 1992, Roma. 
 
Sapienza, P. (1999), ￿What do State-owned Firms Maximize? Evidence from Italian Banks￿, 
manuscript. 
 
Simon, H. A. (1979), ￿Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations￿, American Economic 
Review, 69, pp. 493-513. 
 
Starr, P. (1991), ￿The Case for Skepticism￿, in Privatization and Its Alternatives, ed. Gormley, W. 




PRIVATIZED BANKS IN THE SAMPLE 
Bank    Shares sold (%)  Year  Year of privatization (*) 
Credito  Italiano   54.8 1993  1993 
COMIT   51.3 1994  1994 
1 36.5  1994  IMI 
2 19.0  1995 
1995 
S.  Paolo  Torino   23.2 1997  1997 
Banca di Roma     36.5  1997  1997 
BNL   78.5 1998  1998 
Source: R&S 




TURNOVER OF TOP MANAGERS OF PRIVATIZED BANKS  
  Changing in the year 
  of privatization  after privatization 
Chairman of Board  2  2 





TURNOVER OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF PRIVATIZED BANKS  
Reference period  Members 
of Board  
New members of 
board  
Outgoing members 
of board  
  number  number  % (1)  number  % (1) 
Year before privatization  64         
Year of privatization  73  40  62.5  31  48.4 
Year after privatization  67  57  89.1  54  84.4 


















Other Priv.  Other Priv. Other  Priv.  Other  Priv. 
1990  233522  97339 1.4  2.0  15.3 17.3 62.7 68.7 
1991  240141  97285 2.8  -0.1  15.2 17.7 63.5 68.8 
1992  240748  97390 0.3  0.1  14.9 17.8 64.6 69.8 
1993  242736  97213 0.8  -0.2  15.0 18.2 65.0 70.3 
1994 241971 96966  -0.3  -0.3  14.7  18.3  66.9  71.2 
1995  242693  95200 0.3  -1.8  15.2 18.7 64.7 71.9 
1996 240010 91126  -1.1  -4.3  15.0  18.6  65.5  72.3 
1997 234912 87671  -2.1  -3.8  14.5  18.6  65.3  72.8 
1998 232745 84713  -0.9  -3.4  14.3  18.4  67.2  72.1 
1999 230573 80896  -0.9  -4.5  14.4  18.7  67.6  71.8 
2000  234659  76895 1.8  -4.9  14.7 18.5 67.4 73.5 
(1) From 1995, data include special credit institutions. As percentage of total employees. 





YEAR  NUMBER  GROWTH RATE (%)  TOWNS WITH  BRANCHES OF  
 Priv. Other  Priv.  Other  Priv.  Other 
1990 2958  13523  -  -  930  4874 
1991 3345  14989  13.1  10.8  1054  5003 
1992 3681  16106  10.0  7.5  1152  5098 
1993 4129  17138  12.2  6.4  1250  5194 
1994 4457  17962  7.9  4.8  1347  5296 
1995 4603  18801  3.3  4.7  1374  5358 
1996 4714  19680  2.4  4.7  1421  5426 
1997 4731  20529  0.4  4.3  1454  5456 
1998 4760  21516  0.6  4.8  1455  5684 
1999 4796  22351  0.8  3.9  1455  5715 








SHARE OF SMALL BRANCHES 
(percentages of all branches) 
















Up to 10 
employees 
(ao+bo) 
1990 16.3  21.1  37.4  33.3 31.6 64.9 
1991 22.9  22.6  45.5  37.0 30.4 67.4 
1992 27.0  23.2  50.2  39.7 29.8 69.5 
1993 30.5  23.6  54.1  41.3 29.9 71.2 
1994 35.4  22.4  57.8  43.0 30.0 73.0 
1995 36.0  23.9  59.9  44.8 29.6 74.4 
1996 36.6  24.2  60.8  46.4 29.2 75.6 
1997 35.8  25.1  60.9  48.8 29.3 77.3 
1998 36.1  25.9  62.0  50.4 28.3 78.7 
1999 36.9  26.6  63.5  51.2 28.6 79.8 
2000 37.4  28.1  65.5  52.1 28.9 81.0 
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Table 7 
MAIN INDICATORS ON PROFITABILITY OF PRIVATIZED BANKS 













after tax  
1990 2.90  4.08  1.60  0.71  0.53 16.1 11.8 
1991 2.82  3.83  1.28  0.68  0.40 12.4 7.3 
1992 2.87  3.51  1.08  0.49  0.23  7.8  3.7 
1993 2.68  3.77  1.36  0.71  0.24 11.5 3.9 
1994 2.36  3.33  0.97  0.29  0.17  4.5  2.7 
1995 2.25  3.13  0.95  0.33  0.20  5.2  3.1 
1996 2.18  3.30  1.02  0.34  0.19  5.3  2.9 
1997 1.97  3.14  0.90  -0.50  -0.65 -7.9  -10.2 
1998 2.03  3.66  1.53  0.93  0.51 14.5 8.0 
1999 1.78  3.53  1.51  1.17  0.72 17.9 11.1 
2000 1.69  3.50  1.66  1.11  0.75 21.6 14.6 




























1990 5.4  44.3  3.7  6.2  3.2  0.0  1.7  2.0  0.7  13.4  19.4 
1991 5.0  48.7  2.9  5.2  2.2  0.0  1.5  2.2  0.6  11.7  20.0 
1992 4.7  49.1  4.8  5.4  2.2  0.0  2.2  2.2  1.4  10.0  18.0 
1993 3.8  49.0  5.5  5.8  1.7  0.0  2.0  2.6  2.0  10.5  17.1 
1994 4.0  44.2  5.9  8.6  1.7  0.5  2.0  3.1  2.0  12.0  16.0 
1995 3.2  44.1  5.0  9.0  1.7  0.5  2.3  3.8  2.1  12.3  16.0 
1996 2.6  43.8  4.9  8.4  1.6  0.5  2.6  4.1  2.0  12.9  16.6 
1997 2.8  43.3  4.3  7.2  1.2  0.5  2.6  4.5  2.0  15.0  16.6 
1998 2.3  45.3  3.8  6.0  1.3  1.0  2.9  5.0  1.9  14.5  16.0 
1999 0.8  45.9  4.2  5.8  1.4  1.7  3.6  4.5  1.8  14.3  16.0 


















1990 24.0  8.3  6.2  5.3  6.8  0.0  5.8  16.9  26.7  227984 
1991 23.2  9.4  5.4  4.0  7.5  0.0  6.2  16.8  27.5  251033 
1992 21.7 10.2 4.4  4.9  7.5  0.0  7.7  17.8  25.8  284524 
1993 20.3 11.8 3.8  5.5  7.6  0.0  8.0  17.1  25.9  312873 
1994 19.5 11.2 3.5  5.1  8.4  4.5  7.6  15.4  24.8  344006 
1995 18.5 11.5 3.1  4.9  8.6  5.7  9.1  21.9  16.7  354071 
1996 17.9 11.7 2.8  5.7  9.2  5.9  9.7  20.3  16.8  370819 
1997 18.8  9.4  2.8  5.6  10.9  5.9  9.5  20.2  16.9  384253 
1998  21.6 6.0 2.9  4.8  12.1 5.2  10.5 20.6  16.3  379497 
1999  23.2 3.5 2.7  4.4  11.9 5.0  10.7 22.3  16.3  390694 
2000 23.8  2.0  2.4  5.1  10.4  4.8  9.8  25.1  16.6  417292 
(1) Before 1994, repos were off-balance sheet items 
(2) Amount outstanding in millions of euros.  23
Table 9 
OTHER INDICATORS ON PROFITABILITY (*) 
Non-interest income  Losses on loans  Staff costs 
Total  o/w : trading income  o/w: fees on services 
Year 
 Priv.   Others   Priv.   Others   Priv.   Others   Priv.   Others   Priv.   Others 
1990  0.56  0.53  1.69 1.74 1.17 0.95  0.54  0.50  0.18  0.18 
1991  0.47  0.52  1.76 1.75 1.01 0.97  0.46  0.50  0.12  0.15 
1992  0.44  0.50  1.63 1.61 0.64 0.71  0.13  0.29  0.05  0.12 
1993  0.54  0.80  1.59 1.51 1.08 1.16  0.56  0.65  0.22  0.23 
1994  0.32  0.57  1.59 1.48 0.97 0.84  0.28  0.25  0.27  0.31 
1995  0.45  0.76  1.45 1.54 0.89 0.83  0.25  0.25  0.22  0.29 
1996  0.49  0.47  1.54 1.50 1.11 0.98  0.36  0.38  0.29  0.30 
1997  1.03  0.41  1.46 1.39 1.17 1.04  0.22  0.32  0.45  0.40 
1998  0.68  0.39  1.37 1.25 1.63 1.33  0.31  0.32  0.72  0.59 
1999  0.47  0.39  1.29 1.21 1.75 1.57  0.17  0.17  0.79  0.73 
2000  0.47  0.32  1.13 1.12 1.80 1.73  0.13  0.13  0.81  0.69 
(*) Percentages of  total assets. 
 
Table 10 
RATIOS PER EMPLOYEE (1) 
 Assets per employee  Cost per employee  Year 
Privatized Others  Priv.-Others  Privatized  Others  Priv.-Others 
1990  3128.0  3202.4  -74.4 52.8 55.8 -3.0 
1991  3164.7  3205.1  -40.4 55.6 56.2 -0.6 
1992  3504.5  3645.3  -140.8  57.3 58.7 -1.4 
1993 3713.2  3836.3  -123.1  58.9  58.1  0.8 
1994 3681.6  3943.6  -262.0  58.4  58.2  0.2 
1995  3927.2  3722.1  205.1 57.0 57.4 -0.4 
1996 3809.1  3789.8  19.3  58.6  56.7  1.9 
1997 3986.0  4033.2  -47.2  58.3  56.1  2.2 
1998 3938.7  4263.4  -324.7  53.8  53.3  0.5 
1999 4211.7  4295.6  -83.9  54.4  52.1  2.3 
2000 4632.5  4611.1  21.4  52.4  51.4  1.0 







Year Privatized  Others 
1997 63.5  36.5 
1998 0.0  100.0 
1999 59.6  40.4 
2000 21.4  78.6 
total 37.3  62.7  24
Table 12 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS: IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION 
 AT FIVE BANKS  
Dependent variable  Constant  Binary 
variable 









































































































Number of observations  55 
** significant at the 1% level, * significant at 5% level  25
Table 13 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS: IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION 
AND TIME-TREND (1) 























































































































































Number of observations  55 
(1)  Five banks (IMI is not included). 
** significant at the 1% level, * significant at 5% level  26
Figure 1 
 
(*)Percentage of total assets 
Figure 2 
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